روشنÙکران" طوطی صÙت علم ستیز "
اگر خانم Ùرخنده مدرسی سواد خواندن متون دشوار ÙلسÙÛŒ را دارد مطلب زیر را بخواند Ùˆ از آنچه Ú¯Ùته لااقل پیش خودش شرم کند Ùˆ کمتر یاوه بگوید Ùˆ بیشتر بیندیشد. در مقاله زیر لوچو کولتی نشان Ù…ÛŒ دهد Ú©Ù‡ Ù‡Ú¯Ù„ جهان را Ùرع Ùˆ اصل را ایده یا لوگوس مسیØÛŒ Ù…ÛŒ داند. جهان Ùقط در ایده وجود دارد Ùˆ وجودی مستقل از ایده ندارد.منظور Ù‡Ú¯Ù„ از "خرد" تجسد لوگوس مسیØÛŒ است.علم را Ùهم ساخته Ùˆ چیز مردودی است. Ùهم به اصل امتناع تناقض پایبند است ولی "خرد" جمع نقیضین است. Øمله به علم ریشه ای قوی در ÙلسÙÙ‡ آلمانی دارد Ùˆ با رومانتیک ها آغاز Ù…ÛŒ شود Ùˆ به هایدگر Ù…ÛŒ رسد.
ا
Hegel's philosophy is based on three propositions. The first is that
philosophy is always idealism:
The proposition that the finite it ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of
philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the linite has no
veritable being. . . . This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion
equally does not recognise linitude as a veritable being, as something ultimate
and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, etemal.‘
The second is that the problem of philosophy is to realize the principle of
idealism:
Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its
principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is actually carried
out.‘
The third is that the realization of the principle of idealism implies the
dextruclion of the jinite and the annihilation of the world, since, writes Hegel,
This carrying through of the principle depends primarily on whether the
finite reality still retains an independent self-subsistence alongside the beingfor-
self.â€
The first proposition does not have to be explained: the principle of
idealism is the Idea, the infinite or the Christian Logos. The second will
be clarified below. The most diflicult to understand is the third, which, it
might be added, has also been given the least attention in studies on
Hegel. This can be stated as (a) why idealism must destroy the linite and
annihilate the world in order to be realized, and (b) how this annihilation
can take place.
Point (a) is the easiest to solve. The principle of idealism implies the
destruction of the finite because if the finite is allowed to survive, it
becomes impossible to conceive of the infinite. Hegel writes:
The infinite, in that case, is one of the two; but as only one of the two is it
itself hnite, it is not the whole but only one side; it has its limit in what stands
over against it; it is thus the finite infinite. There are present only two finites.‘
And again (in the En::yeIopedia):
Dualism, which renders the antithesis of the finite and the infinite insuperable,
does not make the simple consideration that in this way the infinite is only one
of the two; that hi this way on.ly something particular is yielded, of which the
fin.ite is the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a particular, stands
alongside the finite; in this it finds its limits or barrier; it is not what it should be,
it is not the infinite but only finite. In such a relationship, where the finite is on
one ride and the infinite on the other, the former here, the latter beyond, the finite
is credited with the same dignity of subsistence and independence that is
attributed to the infinite. The being of the finite is made an absolute being;
within this dualism it stands firm for itself. If, so to speak, it were touched by
the infinite, it would be destroyed. But it cannot be touched by the infinite: an
abyss, an unbridgeable gap is thus opened between the two; the infinite is
fixed beyond, the finite here.‘
We will offer a few explanations to help the reader to a full realization
of the meaning of this text. The infinite as ‘one of the two’, that is, the
false infinite, is the infinite of the ‘intellect’. The infinite as entirety is the
infinite of ‘reason’. ‘The main point is to distinguish the true concept of
infinity from spurious infinity, the infinite of reason from the infinite of
the intellect."
The ‘intellect’ (Verrtand) is the principle of non—contradiction, the
principle of the mutual exclusion or separation of opposites. ‘Rason’ is
the principle of dialectical contradiction or coincidence of opposites. The
first is the logical universal which has its particular or real object outside
itself. The second is the unity of finite and infinite in the infinite, the
unity of thought and being in thought, i.e. ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’,
tauto-heterology or dialectic.
annihilate it but turns it into a ‘firm being’; (2) it finitizes the infinite;
(3) it poses the finite ‘here’ (diesseits), and the infinite ‘beyond’ (femeits) —
i.e. it makes the finite real or terrestrial existence, and the infinite something
merely abstract or ideal.
The substance of the argument is that the ‘intellect’, the principle of
non-contradiction, is common sense, the point of view of materialism
(empiricism) and of science. Everything that philosophy or idealism
asserts — that the finite ‘is not’ and the infinite ‘is’ — the ‘intellect’ presents
in the reverse order. Materialism and science are, therefore, the Unphilosaphie,
that is, the antithesis or negation of philosophy.
Let us now consider briefly the problem of the old or precritical metaphysics
(Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), which also adopts the method of
non-contradiction. Hegel's thesis is that insofar as it is metaphysical, the
principle of this philosophy is the infinite, the absolute; that this philosophy
is therefore true philosophy or idealism. Its fault, however, lies in
the method it uses. The content of this metaphysics is correct, the form
is wrong.7 The substance is ‘philosophical’, the method flatly ‘scientific’.
As a result, the use of the principle of non-contradiction prevents the old
metaphysics from realizing idealism.
The argument to which Hegel frequently resorts in support of this is
an examination of the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God. An
excellent example is provided by the cosmological proofs. ‘Their starting
point,’ says Hegel, ‘is certainly a view of the world in some way as an
aggregate of chance occurrences’, namely, as an accumulation of things
without value. But while in principle these proofs recognize that the
world is merely ephemerality and valuelessness, and that God and God
alone is the true reality, the demonstrative method that they adopt in fact
subverts the direction of their argument. They want to derive the existence
of God from that of the world, maintaining that the existence of the
creature can demonstrate that of the creator. In so doing, they do not
realize that in their syllogism, the world, which is ‘nothing’, becomes the
(mix of the proof, and that God, who is everything, becomes a mere
consequence or something mediated. The creature, which is secondary,
becomes primary; the creator, who is primary, becomes secondary. Thus,
" ibid., p. 316. On this most important page Hegel explains the difference between the
says Hegel, Jacobi made the ‘correct objection’ that they ‘seek the conditions
(the world) for the unconditioned; the infinite (God) in this way is
conceived as mused and dependent.“
In other words,
metaphysical proofs of the existence of God are unsuccessful accounts and
descriptions of the elevation of the Spirit from the world to God, because they
do not express, or rather they do not emphasize, the moment of negation contained
in this elevation; since the world is occidental it is implicit that it is only
something ephemeral and phenomenal, in and for itself a nullity. The meaning
of the elevation of the Spirit is that, while being does indeed belong to the
world, it is only appearance not true being, not absolute truth; that absolute
truth lies only beyond that appearance in God — only God is true being. This
elevation, being a tran:i'ti'on and mediation, is also the sublation of the transition
and mediation, because that in whose mediation God could appear — the world —
is, instead, shown to be nullity. Only the nullity of the being of the world gives
the possibility of elevation, so that whatever is the mediator disappears, whereby
in this mediation itself, mediation is removed.‘
The direction of the argument is, as we can see, that the ‘intellect’, the
principle of non-contradiction, is so closely tied to materialism that even
when it is applied to metaphysical or idealistic premises, it distorts the
meaning of ‘philosophy’ and forces it to say the opposite of what it has in
mind. The finite, which is nothing, is consolidated by the intellect, which
renders it a ‘stable being‘ or foundation. It reduces the infinite, which is
the true reality, to something caused and dependent. The finite, which is
the negative, becomes the positive, i.e. effective existence. The inhnite, on
the other hand, which is the true real, becomes something unreal or
negative, a ‘void’ beyond, ‘something mental or abstract’.
Intellect and reason, then, are two distinct logics:
In ordinary inference the being of the finite appears as ground of the absolute;
because the finite is, therefore the absolute is. But the truth is that the absolute
is, bcause the Finite . . . is not. In the former meaning the inference runs thus:
the being of the finite is the being of the absolute; but in the latter thus: the
non-lvemg of the finite is the being of the absolute.â€
.
science are Unphilosophie. Hence it all depends upon how far a philosophy
can actualize this principle, that is, the realization of idealism. The condition
upon which this realization depends is the destruction of the finite,
the annihilation of the world. (Later we shall see how Hegel obtains this
annihilation.) Once the linite is destroyed, the infinite, that is the Spirit or
God, which ‘intellectualist‘ metaphysics relegates to the ‘beyond’, passes
from the beyond to the here and now and becomes existing and real. This
is the realization of philosophy. It is the immanentization of transcendence,
the ‘secularization of Christianity’,“ the incarnation or actualization
of the divine Logos. In other words, the difference between the old
and the new metaphysics is the difference between ordinary theology and
speculative theology, between theism and philosophy, between precritical
metaphysics and absolute idealism.
Feuerbach saw this clearly. At the beginning of his ‘Provisional Theses’
he wrote: ‘Speculative theology may be distinguished from ordinary
theology by the fact that the divine Being, which the latter removes to
. . . the beyond, is transposed to the here and now, making it present,
determinate and actual.“ Speculative philosophy, he adds in the Prineiples,
‘has made the God which in theism is only an imaginary being, a
remote, indeterminate, vague being, into an actual, determinate being'.“'
ا
Hegel's philosophy is based on three propositions. The first is that
philosophy is always idealism:
The proposition that the finite it ideal constitutes idealism. The idealism of
philosophy consists in nothing else than in recognizing that the linite has no
veritable being. . . . This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion
equally does not recognise linitude as a veritable being, as something ultimate
and absolute or as something underived, uncreated, etemal.‘
The second is that the problem of philosophy is to realize the principle of
idealism:
Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its
principle, and the question then is only how far this principle is actually carried
out.‘
The third is that the realization of the principle of idealism implies the
dextruclion of the jinite and the annihilation of the world, since, writes Hegel,
This carrying through of the principle depends primarily on whether the
finite reality still retains an independent self-subsistence alongside the beingfor-
self.â€
The first proposition does not have to be explained: the principle of
idealism is the Idea, the infinite or the Christian Logos. The second will
be clarified below. The most diflicult to understand is the third, which, it
might be added, has also been given the least attention in studies on
Hegel. This can be stated as (a) why idealism must destroy the linite and
annihilate the world in order to be realized, and (b) how this annihilation
can take place.
Point (a) is the easiest to solve. The principle of idealism implies the
destruction of the finite because if the finite is allowed to survive, it
becomes impossible to conceive of the infinite. Hegel writes:
The infinite, in that case, is one of the two; but as only one of the two is it
itself hnite, it is not the whole but only one side; it has its limit in what stands
over against it; it is thus the finite infinite. There are present only two finites.‘
And again (in the En::yeIopedia):
Dualism, which renders the antithesis of the finite and the infinite insuperable,
does not make the simple consideration that in this way the infinite is only one
of the two; that hi this way on.ly something particular is yielded, of which the
fin.ite is the other particular. Such an infinite, which is only a particular, stands
alongside the finite; in this it finds its limits or barrier; it is not what it should be,
it is not the infinite but only finite. In such a relationship, where the finite is on
one ride and the infinite on the other, the former here, the latter beyond, the finite
is credited with the same dignity of subsistence and independence that is
attributed to the infinite. The being of the finite is made an absolute being;
within this dualism it stands firm for itself. If, so to speak, it were touched by
the infinite, it would be destroyed. But it cannot be touched by the infinite: an
abyss, an unbridgeable gap is thus opened between the two; the infinite is
fixed beyond, the finite here.‘
We will offer a few explanations to help the reader to a full realization
of the meaning of this text. The infinite as ‘one of the two’, that is, the
false infinite, is the infinite of the ‘intellect’. The infinite as entirety is the
infinite of ‘reason’. ‘The main point is to distinguish the true concept of
infinity from spurious infinity, the infinite of reason from the infinite of
the intellect."
The ‘intellect’ (Verrtand) is the principle of non—contradiction, the
principle of the mutual exclusion or separation of opposites. ‘Rason’ is
the principle of dialectical contradiction or coincidence of opposites. The
first is the logical universal which has its particular or real object outside
itself. The second is the unity of finite and infinite in the infinite, the
unity of thought and being in thought, i.e. ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’,
tauto-heterology or dialectic.
annihilate it but turns it into a ‘firm being’; (2) it finitizes the infinite;
(3) it poses the finite ‘here’ (diesseits), and the infinite ‘beyond’ (femeits) —
i.e. it makes the finite real or terrestrial existence, and the infinite something
merely abstract or ideal.
The substance of the argument is that the ‘intellect’, the principle of
non-contradiction, is common sense, the point of view of materialism
(empiricism) and of science. Everything that philosophy or idealism
asserts — that the finite ‘is not’ and the infinite ‘is’ — the ‘intellect’ presents
in the reverse order. Materialism and science are, therefore, the Unphilosaphie,
that is, the antithesis or negation of philosophy.
Let us now consider briefly the problem of the old or precritical metaphysics
(Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz), which also adopts the method of
non-contradiction. Hegel's thesis is that insofar as it is metaphysical, the
principle of this philosophy is the infinite, the absolute; that this philosophy
is therefore true philosophy or idealism. Its fault, however, lies in
the method it uses. The content of this metaphysics is correct, the form
is wrong.7 The substance is ‘philosophical’, the method flatly ‘scientific’.
As a result, the use of the principle of non-contradiction prevents the old
metaphysics from realizing idealism.
The argument to which Hegel frequently resorts in support of this is
an examination of the metaphysical proofs of the existence of God. An
excellent example is provided by the cosmological proofs. ‘Their starting
point,’ says Hegel, ‘is certainly a view of the world in some way as an
aggregate of chance occurrences’, namely, as an accumulation of things
without value. But while in principle these proofs recognize that the
world is merely ephemerality and valuelessness, and that God and God
alone is the true reality, the demonstrative method that they adopt in fact
subverts the direction of their argument. They want to derive the existence
of God from that of the world, maintaining that the existence of the
creature can demonstrate that of the creator. In so doing, they do not
realize that in their syllogism, the world, which is ‘nothing’, becomes the
(mix of the proof, and that God, who is everything, becomes a mere
consequence or something mediated. The creature, which is secondary,
becomes primary; the creator, who is primary, becomes secondary. Thus,
" ibid., p. 316. On this most important page Hegel explains the difference between the
says Hegel, Jacobi made the ‘correct objection’ that they ‘seek the conditions
(the world) for the unconditioned; the infinite (God) in this way is
conceived as mused and dependent.“
In other words,
metaphysical proofs of the existence of God are unsuccessful accounts and
descriptions of the elevation of the Spirit from the world to God, because they
do not express, or rather they do not emphasize, the moment of negation contained
in this elevation; since the world is occidental it is implicit that it is only
something ephemeral and phenomenal, in and for itself a nullity. The meaning
of the elevation of the Spirit is that, while being does indeed belong to the
world, it is only appearance not true being, not absolute truth; that absolute
truth lies only beyond that appearance in God — only God is true being. This
elevation, being a tran:i'ti'on and mediation, is also the sublation of the transition
and mediation, because that in whose mediation God could appear — the world —
is, instead, shown to be nullity. Only the nullity of the being of the world gives
the possibility of elevation, so that whatever is the mediator disappears, whereby
in this mediation itself, mediation is removed.‘
The direction of the argument is, as we can see, that the ‘intellect’, the
principle of non-contradiction, is so closely tied to materialism that even
when it is applied to metaphysical or idealistic premises, it distorts the
meaning of ‘philosophy’ and forces it to say the opposite of what it has in
mind. The finite, which is nothing, is consolidated by the intellect, which
renders it a ‘stable being‘ or foundation. It reduces the infinite, which is
the true reality, to something caused and dependent. The finite, which is
the negative, becomes the positive, i.e. effective existence. The inhnite, on
the other hand, which is the true real, becomes something unreal or
negative, a ‘void’ beyond, ‘something mental or abstract’.
Intellect and reason, then, are two distinct logics:
In ordinary inference the being of the finite appears as ground of the absolute;
because the finite is, therefore the absolute is. But the truth is that the absolute
is, bcause the Finite . . . is not. In the former meaning the inference runs thus:
the being of the finite is the being of the absolute; but in the latter thus: the
non-lvemg of the finite is the being of the absolute.â€
.
science are Unphilosophie. Hence it all depends upon how far a philosophy
can actualize this principle, that is, the realization of idealism. The condition
upon which this realization depends is the destruction of the finite,
the annihilation of the world. (Later we shall see how Hegel obtains this
annihilation.) Once the linite is destroyed, the infinite, that is the Spirit or
God, which ‘intellectualist‘ metaphysics relegates to the ‘beyond’, passes
from the beyond to the here and now and becomes existing and real. This
is the realization of philosophy. It is the immanentization of transcendence,
the ‘secularization of Christianity’,“ the incarnation or actualization
of the divine Logos. In other words, the difference between the old
and the new metaphysics is the difference between ordinary theology and
speculative theology, between theism and philosophy, between precritical
metaphysics and absolute idealism.
Feuerbach saw this clearly. At the beginning of his ‘Provisional Theses’
he wrote: ‘Speculative theology may be distinguished from ordinary
theology by the fact that the divine Being, which the latter removes to
. . . the beyond, is transposed to the here and now, making it present,
determinate and actual.“ Speculative philosophy, he adds in the Prineiples,
‘has made the God which in theism is only an imaginary being, a
remote, indeterminate, vague being, into an actual, determinate being'.“'